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How much, and in what ways, is a judge different from the rest of us for the 
purpose of determining what restrictions on judicial speech are appropriate and 
permissible?
This article will examine judicial free speech from an American perspective. 
The American “law” on the matter is not a uniform, fully developed body but, 
rather, is comprised of the law of fifty different states and the federal judicial 
system. Likewise, there is no single approach that American lawyers, scholars or 
judges would agree on as “the” American viewpoint in this area of law and ethics, 
and while both state and federal formulations are limited by the free speech 
principles of the First Amendment, these constitutional issues have neither been 
presented to nor definitively resolved by the United States Supreme Court.
For these reasons, this article will not attempt to state “the American law” of 
judicial free speech. Instead it will attempt to examine how judicial free speech 
issues might be approached within the structure of American judicial standards 
and to set forth a general framework for approaching the kinds of free expression 
issues involved in judicial speech. That examination and its resulting general 
framework is based primarily on two sources: the representative American ethical 
standards of judicial conduct and the constitutional concerns of the American First 
Amendment that may both inform and limit the application of those standards.
I. American Standards Governing Judicial Expression
Although each of the fifty American states and the federal government has its own 
authoritative standards of judicial conduct, the American Bar Association’s Model 
Code of Judicial Conduct1 is the basis upon which almost all American states have 
formed their judicial conduct rules. It is therefore fair to view the Model Code as 
representative of the current American approach to defining the acceptable 
standards governing judicial conduct and speech and to begin with a survey of
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those provisions. Some of these deal directly with issues of speech while others 
deal with conduct in general, whether speech or non-speech conduct, that may 
have implications for what a judge may or may not appropriately say in certain 
circumstances.
I (a) Speech Directly Involved in Judges’ Specific Case Work
Perhaps not surprisingly, the most specific Model Code standards explicitly 
affecting judicial speech are those most directly related to the individual judges’ 
conduct of their own judicial business and, for the most part, deal with speech that 
is necessarily and directly involved in the actual work of the individual judges. The 
restrictions they impose, and the reasons underlying them, are those that are 
inherent in the central role of a judge as an impartial arbiter of individual cases 
within a system of justice under law and are primarily concerned with protecting 
the appearance and reality of judicial impartiality.
A judge is forbidden expression that “manifests] bias or prejudice” against 
participants, especially with regard to bias “based on race, sex, religion, national 
origin, disability, age, sexual orientation or socioeconomic status.”2 A judge is 
also forbidden from engaging in ex parte discussions concerning proceedings that 
are before the judge.3 Both of these provisions are clearly designed to maintain 
both actual and apparent impartiality by the one whose neutrality is mandated in 
the very cases over which she presides. Less exclusively, yet no less clearly related 
to protecting judicial impartiality, are requirements that a judge must be 
courteous,4 and is forbidden, as are the litigants and attorneys, from disclosing 
confidential information in a case or from using it other than for proper judicial 
purposes.5
A judge is specifically forbidden from commending or criticizing jurors with 
regard to their verdict. The expressed purpose of this rule is to avoid “imply[ing] 
a judicial expectation [by the judge] in future cases” which might “impair a juror’s 
ability to be fair and impartial in a subsequent case,” if a present juror served on 
another jury before the same judge in the future. The judge may, however, more
2Ibid at Canon 3B(5). Canon 3B(6) also requires the judge to hold lawyers in the proceeding to the 
same standard, but puiports not to preclude “legitmate advocacy” when those specified subjects “are 
issues in the proceeding.”
3Ibid. at Canon 3B(7).
4“A judge shall be patient, dignified and courteous to [everyone] with whom the judge deals in an 
official c a p a c i t y Ibid. at Canon 3B(4).
5“A judge shall not disclose or use, for any purpose unrelated to judicial duties, nonpublic information 
acquired in a judicial capacity.” Ibid. at Canon 3B(4).
neutrally express her appreciation for the jurors’ service generally to the judicial 
system and community.6
The final provision in this category prohibits a judge from publicly commenting 
on any proceeding that is “pending or impending” in any court. An earlier, 1972 
version of the Model Code prohibited all such comment except when it was in the 
course of a judge’s official duties, was an explanation of court procedures, or 
involved proceedings in which the judge was a litigant in her own personal 
capacity.7 The 1990 revision of the Model Code retained the basic 1972 rule but 
limited the prohibition to comments that “might reasonably be expected to affect 
[the proceeding’s] outcome or impair its fairness.” The 1990 revision also 
extended the prohibition to any nonpublic comment “that might substantially 
interfere with a trial or hearing.”8 The revised national model thus sacrificed the 
clarity of the bright line rule for, at least theoretically, greater freedom of judicial 
expression with regard to unfinished cases presently pending or likely to be 
brought before other judges.
I (b) Extra-Judicial Conduct That Affects the Judicial Role Generally
A second basic category of restrictions are those directed at conduct generally, 
rather than specifically at speech. Speech is, however, one of the forms of conduct 
that may raise the dangers against which these restrictions are intended to guard. 
They are restrictions that may implicate the propriety or impropriety of both 
speech directly involved in judges’ judicial duties and speech that concerns issues 
of general public interest and occurs in a judge’s extra-judicial activities.
Some of these code restrictions are quite directly related to insulating judicial 
proceedings from bias or the appearance of bias, yet in a more general sense that 
is not as explicitly tied to particular cases. A judge is required to conduct all of 
her extra-judicial activities “so that they do not ... cast reasonable doubt on the 
judge’s capacity to act impartially as a judge ...”.9 In a provision that suggests an 
implicit obligation to exercise restraint in making extra-judicial comments related 
to issues that may come before her, a judge is also obligated to recuse herself
6Ibid. at Canon 3B(10).
7American Bar Association, Code of Judicial Conduct (1972).
sSupra note 1 at Canon 3B(9). In its comprehensive revision of its judicial conduct code, the Maine 
Supreme Judicial Court chose to retain the broader rule of the 1972 version, thus leaving the 
prohibition in effect as to all public comment on any pending or impending case. Maine Code of 
Judicial Conduct, Canon 3B(9) (1993).
9Ibid., Model Code at Canon 4A(1). The same provision also requires that extra-judicial conduct not 
“demean the judicial office ... [or] interfere with the proper performance of judicial duties.” at Canon 
4A(2) and (3).
from matters in which the judge’s impartiality “may reasonably be questioned.”10 
This may especially be true when considered in connection with a judge’s general 
obligations to avoid the need for recusal and to be available for the judicial work 
of deciding cases.11
Private associational activities, while not speech in a stricter sense of verbal 
expression, involve matters often closely related to expression and are ordinarily 
accorded substantial protection under the First Amendment. A judge is forbidden 
under the Model Code from membership in any organization that “practices 
invidious discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion or national origin”,12 
a provision obviously intended to protect against the appearance of unfairness or 
partiality in any cases that may involve members of groups that are too often the 
victims of the kinds of discrimination designated in the Model Code.
Other provisions, while not unrelated to preserving the crucial fact and 
appearance of judicial impartiality, largely involve the more general protection of 
public confidence in the propriety and integrity of, and public respect for, those 
who are charged with the responsibility and authority to impose decisions on other 
people’s disputes. A judge must avoid “impropriety and the appearance of 
impropriety” in all of her activities,13 and must “act at all times in a manner that 
promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary”.14
“[L]end[ing] the prestige of the judicial office to advance the private interests 
of the judge or others,” is directly forbidden by the Model Code in those general 
terms15 as well as specifically in connection with fund-raising even for 
governmental, civic or charitable organizations, or in publicly appearing before or 
consulting with such bodies except with regard to the law, the legal system or the
10Ibid. at Canon 3E(1).
nIbid. at Canon 3B(1) explicitly requires a judge to “hear and decide matters assigned to the judge 
except those in which disqualification is required.” Other provisions require judges to avoid activities 
that may lead to a frequent need to recuse: serving as an officer or advisor to a civic, charitable or 
governmental organization that will likely be involved in proceedings that would ordinarily come 
before the judge’s court’s appellate jurisdiction, Canon 4C(3)(a); frequent financial transactions or 
continuing business relationships with persons likely to come before the court on which the judge 
serves, Canon 3D(l)(b); gifts or other favors from anyone whose interests have or are likely to come 
before the judge, Canon 4D(5)(h). A judge is required to manage her investments so as “to minimi™ 
the number of cases in which the judge is disqualified”, Canon 4D(4).
l2Ibid. at Canon 2C
^Ibid. at Canon 2.
14Ibid. at Canon 2A.
administration of justice.16 Speech, of course, would be the primary vehicle for 
most of the conduct that might violate these provisions.
And underlying everything is the extraordinary proposition that “the judicial 
duties of a judge take precedence over all the judge’s other activities.”17 In other 
words, judging, if not the whole of one’s life, must control and preclude all other 
things that may interfere or be inconsistent with doing the job of a judge.
The generality of some of these provisions, coupled with the fact that they also 
represent much that is at the heart of the special nature of what it is to be a judge, 
can put these ethical mandates in an especially problematic tension with the 
special importance that the First Amendment attaches to the free discussion of 
public issues and makes the issue of judges’ “political” speech, dealt with in the 
following section, among the most difficult issues to resolve.
I (c) Speech About Politics and Public Issues18
The provisions of the Model Code that deal directly with political speech expressly 
forbid only certain designated political activities involving speech that place a judge 
right in the midst of partisan politics. The exact parameters of permissible speech 
concerning the law and the legal system, as well as non-legal matters, are less 
specifically addressed, being permitted generally (or at least not expressly 
forbidden), yet subject to the other requirements of the Code whose principles 
may impose restraints that are not explicitly set forth with regard to judicial speech 
in the political arena. The most problematic form of those “other requirements” 
are the general standards discussed in the preceding section of this article.
Expressly forbidden are (1) public endorsement of or opposition to candidates, 
(2) speeches on behalf of political organizations, (3) attendance at political 
rallies,19 and (4) appearances at public hearings before, or engaging in other 
kinds of consultation with, executive or legislative bodies or officials “except on
l6Ibid. at Canon 4C(1) and 4C(3)(b)(i) and (iii).
17Ibid. at Canon 3A.
18 In order to concentrate on the general questions involved in judicial free speech, this article does 
not address the more specialized question of political speech or activity involved when a judge is a 
candidate for judicial office.
ï9Supra note 1 at Canon 5A(l)(b),(c) and (d). A “political organization” is defined in the Code as 
“a political party or other group, the principal purpose of which is to further the election or 
appointment of candidates to political office.” Ibid. at ‘Terminology”. Some states might apply the 
restrictive view to general political activity beyond those activities specifically enumerated in the Model 
Code. Maine, for example, added a provision prohibiting “any other political activity” except that 
which is “authorized” by other sections of the Code or is “on behalf of measures to improve the law, 
the legal system, or the administration of justice.” Maine Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 5A(l)(f)-
matters concerning the law, the legal system or the administration of justice.”20 
These are the kinds of political activity and speech that are inherently likely to 
undermine both the reality and the appearance that a judge is separate from the 
ordinary influences of ordinary politics, and thus independently able and inclined 
to decide cases fairly and according to law -  the basic requisite of judicial 
independence that lies at the foundation of the separation of powers. Active 
participation in partisan politics, or activities that have the effect of putting a judge 
into the governing processes of the executive or legislative bodies, are inherently 
inconsistent with a judge’s job description.
On the other hand, a Model Code provision purporting to deal with 
“avocational”, rather than explicitly with “political” activities, expressly permits a 
judge’s expression, teaching, and participation in activities concerning “the law, the 
legal system [and] the administration of justice.” Yet, the same provision also 
permits the same kinds of speech activities concerning “non-legal subjects.” In 
other words, expression about everything is permitted, except the specified political 
participation that is expressly prohibited, and all expression that is permitted, 
whether about the law or non-legal subjects, is expressly made subject to the 
general principles governing judicial conduct.21
Unfortunately, although for understandable reasons, those issues that are most 
difficult are always the ones that the “rules” do not resolve. The lines between 
issues concerning the law and issues that are political in nature, or between those 
that are partisan and those that are non-partisan, are difficult or impossible to 
draw. The differences in consequences between speech “concerning the law” and 
that concerning “non-legal subjects,” or whether there even are any such 
differences, are unclear from the Model Code's text. They must instead be 
resolved by the presumably ad hoc application of those other “requirements of this 
Code”, to which speech concerning both law and non-legal subjects appears, from 
the text, to be equally subject.
The official “Commentary” to the “avocational activity” provision of Canon 4B 
may be instructive on the Model Code's approach to these ambiguous 
inter-relationships and its view of the proper role of a judge and her speech within 
the social-legal-political system, although the commentary provides no clear 
resolution of the issues.
As a judicial officer and person specially learned in the law, a judge is in a unique 
position to contribute to the improvement of the law, the legal system, and the 
administration of justice, including revision of substantive and procedural law and 
improvement of criminal and juvenile justice. To the extent that time permits, a
xIbid. Model Code note 1 at Canon 4C(1).
21Ibid. at Canon 4B.
judge is encouraged to do so, either independently or through a bar association, 
judicial conference or other association dedicated to the improvement of the law. 
Judges may participate in efforts to promote the fair administration of justice, the 
independence of the judiciary and the integrity of the legal profession and may 
express opposition to the persecution of lawyers and judges in other countries 
because of their professional activities.22
The subjects seemingly “favored” for judicial expressiveness -  the law, the 
legal system, and the administration of justice -  are matters in which judges have 
both a special knowledge and a special, even official, interest and responsibility 
concerning fhp. issues involved in political discussion. The exemption for 
consultation with other governmental branches on these subjects can be explained 
and justified on the basis of their official responsibilities and central role in the 
operation of the judicial system. It is inherently necessary for judges to deal with 
other governmental bodies and officials simply to maintain and manage the 
operation of the judicial system itself.
But apart from this recognition of the need for intergovernmental consultation 
in the operation of the courts and the textual provisions explicitly prohibiting 
designated forms of “partisan” political speech, the commentary suggests that the 
unique expertise of judges in the legal system and profession is a reason to 
encourage judges to express themselves on issues concerning the law and the legal 
system, at least by way of working to “improve” it. While there is no comparable 
affirmative justification encouraging comment about the “non-legal” subjects also 
referred to in the text, neither the commentary nor the text suggests that such 
judicial expression is forbidden as long as it does not violate the unspecified other 
provisions” of the Code. Likewise, while the thrust of the commentary seems to 
suggest some preference for directing judicial law reform efforts into mainstream 
channels, neither the commentary nor the text precludes a judge from being the 
lone advocate of unorthodox measures for reform. Further, neither the 
commentary nor the text addresses the problem of distinguishing between law 
“reform” and something other than reform, like retrogression or defense of the 
status quo.
Special problems of free speech and censorship would arise if these provisions 
of the Code contemplate a distinction between “good” law reform and 
“undesirable” change. While any notion of “improving” something implicitly 
suggests changing it, common sense interpretation, as well as First Amendment 
mandates, could sensibly interpret the requirements only in a way that would 
provide equal freedom to oppose suggested reforms and advocate the status quo. 
Similar objections to unacceptable viewpoint discrimination would also prevail
22Ibid. at Canon 4B, “Commentary”. The “Commentary” also notes that the reference to the other 
requirements of the Code “is included to remind judges that the use of permissive language ... does 
not relieve a judge from the other requirements of the Code that apply to the specific conduct.
against the commentary’s explicit approval of expressed opposition to the 
persecution of lawyers and judges “in other countries”. To the extent the 
commentary implies that a judge may not do the same with regard to events in the 
United States, surely a judge’s speech would be equally protected if a judge 
believed, for example, that contempt sanctions imposed on an attorney in a 
completed case constituted “political persecution.”23
The resolution of issues arising in the area of extra-judicial political and public 
issue speech lie in the interpretation and application of a very indefinite text. The 
proper and sensitive interpretation of what “rules” may be lurking in that text can 
be informed by the ethical considerations underlying the “other requirements” of 
the Model Code and the concerns, values and nature of free expression. They are, 
of course, also limited by the constitutional restraints of the First Amendment. 
The desirable interpretation, however, may best be achieved simply by interpreting 
the rules in a way that respects those constitutional limits and the reasons that 
underlie them.
II. The Speech-Protective Nature of the American First Amendment
The United States Supreme Court, through a process of decisions and opinions 
over the past three-quarters of this century, has developed a First Amendment 
tradition of relatively stringent, constitutionally mandated, protection for individual 
speech that appears to be unique within the world community. Since part of the 
task of this article is to assess the nature of American restrictions on judicial 
speech against the background of the general American approach to 
constitutionally-based speech protections, my treatment of First Amendment 
principles will be more general than would be necessary to defend the approach 
suggested here against challenges by other competing views of what particular 
doctrines comprise American First Amendment law.
Although it is true that “the First Amendment is not an absolute” in the sense 
of forbidding all regulation or prohibition of whatever is verbal or expressive, the 
use of such an obvious proposition as a starting point for First Amendment 
analysis seems to me unhelpful at best and, at worst, destructive of what the First 
Amendment in fact is. It is doubtful that anyone who has given significant thought 
to the meaning of the First Amendment has ever believed it to be “absolute” in 
the sense described. Starting with a denial that it is absolute has often been used
^ h e  content-neutral prohibition in Canon 3B(9) ibid. of either favorable or unfavorable comment 
that might affect the outcome or impair the fairness of any case pending in any court would not run 
afoul of this problem since that provision is both directly related to the central necessity of protecting 
the impartiality of judicial decision-making in the specific case and is not drawn into operation only 
by the criticism of the system.
as a strawperson in an effort to avoid or soften the need for the more stringent 
and particularized analysis that traditional First Amendment principles require.
An initial illustration of what seems to me to be a more accurate and helpful 
view of the uniquely speech-protective strains of American First Amendment 
doctrine lies in the relationship, and the basis for its distinction between 
“protected” and “unprotected” speech. An integral and fundamental First 
Amendment principle, that largely underlies the Supreme Court’s determination 
that certain categories of speech are “unprotected”, is that speech within those 
categories has little or no expressive role in productive discussion or in the free 
marketplace of ideas. This articulated basis is fundamental, whether or not one 
agrees with the court’s application of the principle to any one or all of the 
“unprotected” categories. The First Amendment does set aside certain categories 
of speech as “unprotected” by the First Amendment — deliberately or recklessly 
false expression such as perjury or defamatory statements about public officials or 
public figures, negligent defamation of private persons, personal threats of physical 
violence, “fighting words”, “obscenity”, and advocacy that amounts to a direct 
incitement of illegal conduct and that also has a likelihood of producing that 
objective.24
Yet, speech on the other side of those deliberately drawn lines is 
comprehensively protected: false defamation that does not have the requisite fault; 
advocacy of violently overthrowing the government that does not constitute direct 
incitement or produce a clear and present danger; deliberately provocative speech 
that does not fall within the narrow definition of fighting words; and sexually 
descriptive passages that most communities would find patently offensive and 
highly “prurient”, but that have an arguable literary or artistic role within the work 
as a whole. The fact that these categories are narrowly drawn by the Court 
underlines an additional important factor in understanding the nature of the 
balance struck by the First Amendment. It gives a high value to free speech and 
recognizes the dangers of presuming that a majority can lay a legitimate claim to 
either the ability or the authority to determine what is true or to discount the 
value or truth of minority expression.
A second illustration of the First Amendment’s speech-protective approach lies 
in its treatment of social interests that compete with the value of “protected” 
speech. While the interests in constitutionally protected speech are not wholly free 
from competition with other societal concerns, the justification for restrictions is
^ “Fighting words” are words directed personally at an individual or individuals that are designed or 
inherently likely to provoke violence with little or no furtherance of the exchange of information or ideas. 
“Obscenity” refers to expression that depicts or describes bodily functions in a manner that is patently 
offensive under contemporary standards, and that appeals to a prurient interest in sex or bodily 
functions, and that is determined to have no substantial educational, literary, artistic or scientific value 
when considered in the context of the whole expressive work of which it is a part.
assessed under the heavily speech-favouring, albeit subjective, formula of whether 
the competing interest is “compelling” or “of the highest order” and whether the 
particular restriction is “necessary” in order to achieve the competing interest by 
means that are the “least restrictive” of the opportunities for expression. This is 
especially true of speech having to do with public or political issues. Likewise, 
while “reasonable regulations” of the “time, place and manner” of speech have 
long been allowable under First Amendment rubrics, they are allowable only if 
they are not unduly restrictive of the opportunities to convey the message and are 
not based on a desire to suppress it.
That which gives American First Amendment jurisprudence whatever unique 
value or disability it may have is thus reflected even in the non-“absolutist” 
doctrines, which themselves represent and contain stringently protective strains to 
try to safeguard free expression in a world that by its nature is often hostile to the 
unpopular idea or to factual assertions that are considered to have been generally 
or completely discredited. In requiring this approach, the First Amendment does 
sometimes get in the way of what an overwhelming majority, or an influential 
profession, may deem to be important social policy, but it does so on the judgment 
that the protection of speech from just such determinations is an even more 
fundamental policy for the long-term public good. That’s what it’s there for.
III. A General Framework for Assessing Judicial Speech Restrictions
III (a) Speech Directly Involved in Judges’ Specific Case Work
As noted earlier, the most explicit Model Code restrictions concern speech by a 
judge in her own judicial work or speech that may have a direct impact on the 
judicial work of other judges or on the legal system’s operation in actual cases. 
Even the speech-protective principles of the First Amendment pose little or no 
problem for speech-related rules that are a crucial part of a job description on 
matters that directly involve the actual work of the judiciary or the operation of 
the system of justice in which the judiciary exists.
There should be no more problem in restricting a judge’s public comments on 
actual cases that are pending or impending in the court system, before that judge 
or another, than there is in preventing the American ambassador to Karachi from 
contradicting directions from Washington about the American position with regard 
to Pakistan, from conveying either truthful information or the ambassador’s own 
candid opinion concerning the direction of “tilt” between Pakistan and India in 
American foreign policy, or for that matter, from giving her honest and thoughtful 
opinion about the proper United States policy on some point of difference 
between her government and that of Canada, even though, as the ambassador to
a different country, that is not “her case.” Such restrictions are simply inherently 
attached to the nature of both positions in a most direct way.
The same is true of restrictions on speech that undercuts the appearance of 
impartiality, both speech that occurs in the cases that are before that judge and 
general statements and associational memberships that are inherently likely to 
cause reasonable question about the ability of the judge to be impartial in cases 
that are highly likely to come before the judge at some future time, such as cases 
involving groups who are common victims of discrimination and stereotypes. Just 
as an attorney is forbidden by duties of loyalty from speaking against her client’s 
interest in a matter in which the attorney represents the client, so may a judge be 
forbidden from speaking in a way that compromises that impartiality to which the 
judge owes the highest duty. Likewise, if a police officer can be barred from 
revealing information from a confidential investigation, a judge can be barred from 
disclosing what all the other participants in a case are barred from revealing. 
Requiring that a judge’s speech be courteous to those who appear before her is 
at least as easily justified as requiring the same from a grocery clerk at the 
checkout counter. This is especially so given the added and crucial nuances that 
undue impatience, discourtesy or undignified expression engaged in by a judge in 
the course of a trial or other judicial duties can hold for the perception of 
impartiality.
In First Amendment terms, the justification follows from the centrality of the 
judicial function and the direct relationship of the explicit speech restrictions to the 
nature of the judicial position. The restrictions are inherent elements in the 
description of a socially crucial job, clearly necessary and sharply related to a 
social interest of the highest order — the maintenance of, and public confidence in, 
the impartial operation of the system for dispensing equal justice under law.
The same is true for the more general restrictions of conduct that may involve 
speech occurring within a judge’s official duties. An example that has stirred 
recent debate within Canada is the Marshall Prosecution, in which, according to the 
Inquiry Commission’s report, an appellate court included in its opinion some 
conclusions concerning the fault of a wrongfully convicted defendant that were 
unsupported by the record, not relevant to the decision, and unfair to the 
defendant in ways that were gratuitously harmful.25
Since the speech in such a case is so inextricably linked to the execution of the 
judicial task, no greater problem of free speech is involved in subjecting such 
conduct to accountability review than if a judge had deliberately misinstructed the
^See generally Report to the Canadian Judicial Council of Inquiry Committee Established Pursuant to 
subsection 63(1) of the Judges Act at the Request of the Attorney General of Nova Scotia (1991) 40 
U.N.B.LJ. 210.
jury. The question in both cases would be whether a judge had failed in the 
proper performance of the judicial task. For the same reasons that rules explicitly 
regulating speech directly involved in a judge’s work can be justified, rules 
regulating conduct that may include speech can constitutionally preclude a judge 
from revealing to the jury the judge’s own strong and well-based belief of a 
criminal defendant’s guilt, or admitting inadmissible evidence simply because the 
judge feels certain that it is true, or using the judicial office to lay blame that is 
unsupported by the record and irrelevant to resolving the issues before the judge. 
All these things would violate what it is to be a judge in a most direct way.
Such situations may, however, be complicated by the fact that the “findings” 
appear, at least on the surface, to involve the kind of judgment necessary to 
judicial decision-making. While a judge may be right or wrong in finding the facts 
or applying the law, such errors, as a matter of practicality or fairness, cannot 
ordinarily be matters for discipline.26 Although the codes of judicial conduct do 
require a judge to adhere to the law in decision-making, substantial deference is 
required if every decision on the facts or law is not to be turned into a question 
of accountability or discipline. As the correctness of judicial rulings and the 
relevance of the remarks in a judge’s opinion become more debatable, disciplinary 
review may become less appropriate. That is not because speech is involved, 
however, but rather because the disciplinary review of judicial decision-making 
would then start to impinge more heavily on the judicial function itself and more 
dangerously on the judicial independence necessary to make correct, but 
unpopular, decisions, or to explain them accurately and candidly.27
Ill (b) Extra-Judicial Speech: Public Issues and Politics28
The issues involved in the proper or permissible regulation of judicial speech that 
occurs outside the context of a judge’s judicial work are more difficult precisely 
because they do not ordinarily have the same direct connection to a judge’s work 
that most clearly justifies restrictions in other situations. To the extent that 
extra-judicial speech does directly affect judicial duties, as in extra-judicial
^See Matter of Benoit (1985), 487 A. (2d) 1158 at 1162-1164 (Me.) where it was held that a legal error 
constitutes misconduct, rather than a reversible error, only if a reasonably prudent and competent 
judge would consider that conduct obviously and seriously wrong under all of the circumstances in 
which the error was committed.
^ o  say that deference is appropriate to disciplinary review of judicial decision-making, including 
explanations in a judicial opinion, is to urge caution, not abdication. Little, if any, deference is due 
with regard to rulings that are unacceptably wrong and have serious consequences. Errors that are 
established to be deliberate call for no deference at all.
mAs indicated earlier, in order to concentrate on the general questions involved injudicial free speech, 
this article does not address the more specialized question of political speech or activity involved when 
a judge is a candidate for judicial office.
comment on cases pending before other judges, restrictions would of course be 
constitutionally justified on the same basis.
By prohibiting political partisanship in its most naked forms, the Model Code 
suggests that explicit political activity is inconsistent with the nature of the judicial 
office. On the other hand, by not expressly prohibiting all public issue speech by 
judges, and even encouraging speech with regard to the law and judicial 
administration, the Code clearly suggests that not all broadly political speech is 
inappropriate for members of the judiciary. Yet, the permissible area is left 
largely undefined -  governed only by a general reference to the other provisions 
of the Code, some of the most important of which are themselves general and 
undefined.
All that can be offered within the scope of this article is an effort to suggest 
a general framework as a starting point for assessing the various situations and 
kinds of judicial commentary that can arise. The formulation is based on the 
Model Code's exclusion of speech directly undermining judicial impartiality in 
actual or likely cases, its exclusion of partisan political activity, its general 
recognition of the permissibility of extra-judicial public issue speech by judges, the 
protection of the nature of the judicial office that is reflected in the “other 
provisions” of the Model Code to which all extra-judicial speech is subject, and the 
speech-protective principles underlying the First Amendment. The framework, in 
short, attempts to set forth the factors that seem most relevant to determining the 
balance between the presumption of free speech on public issues and those social 
interests that, in terms of First Amendment doctrine, are of the highest order and 
are directly related to the essential and necessary nature of being a judge.
The two factors I would propose as a starting point for determining what 
speech can be deemed impermissible for judges are based on two of the matters 
that are most clearly among the central concerns of the Model Code and whose 
prohibition is among the most clearly permissible under the First Amendment: (1) 
the extent to which a judge’s extra-judicial statements deal with issues or persons 
likely to be involved in cases over which the judge must, or ought to, preside; and 
(2) the extent to which a judge’s comments are partisan in nature or context, 
rather than addressed more generally to issues of public policy. In order to assess 
the appropriateness of particular remarks or the practice of a particular judge with 
regard to the second factor -  the extent to which the speech or practice is 
unacceptably partisan — two other factors may come into play: (a) the extent and 
frequency with which a particular judge engages in public political discussion, so 
that the greater the frequency, the greater the danger that the line between the 
judicial and the general political functions is crossed by the judge and thereby for 
the judiciary in general; and (b) the extent to which the issues addressed are 
within or outside the realm of issues arguably related to the proper operation and 
structure of the legal system.
The easiest of these considerations to identify and deal with is the public issue 
speech that is challenged because it involves issues that are likely to come before 
the judge. Such speech would seem to be at least implicitly governed by the 
explicit prohibition on public comment on pending or impending cases. The Code 
prohibition would explicitly apply to any speech, whether in or out of court, that 
literally came within its proscription. It would be justified constitutionally because 
of its direct relationship to the central need of the judicial system to maintain 
impartiality and avoid the actuality and appearance of prejudgment by the 
presiding judge or the judicial system in the actual pending or impending cases 
that were the subject of the remarks and would apply to all of a judge’s public 
speech, whether political or otherwise. Even where there is a question as to 
whether the remarks are explicitly directed at a particular case, the principle could 
apply to all of a judge’s public speech that clearly implicates issues in pending or 
impending cases, whether political or otherwise.
In the area of public issue or political speech, this principle might well come 
into play in the case of remarks directed to general political issues that involve the 
power of the legislature to enact or of the executive to administer or enforce laws
— questions concerning the constitutionality of particular proposed actions. Such 
comments might well involve judicially cognizable issues that could come before 
that judge or other judges. Such pronouncements on litigable issues concerning 
the power of the political branches of government would be as inappropriate, when 
made outside of the deliberative judicial process for considering and resolving 
them, as if a judge had publicly announced her belief that a newly indicted 
defendant was guilty (or innocent) before a trial had occurred. Whether or not 
this was improper would depend on the likelihood that the issues would be raised 
in future litigation.
The question of partisanship in public issue speech beyond the 
nakedly-partisan political activities specifically designated in the Model Code is far 
more difficult. Those difficulties raise a question as to whether it is even possible 
to draw any effective or predictable intermediate line between speech that is 
closely and narrowly associated with the administration of the judicial system and 
speech that is essentially analogous to the Code's explicitly barred political 
activities.
The Model Code is surely correct in its position that nakedly partisan political 
activity inherently undermines both judicial impartiality and judicial independence 
from the regular democratic political process, both of which are essential to 
judges' ability to decide individual cases fairly and according to the law. Its explicit 
prohibition of those designated activities specifically supplements other provisions 
of the Code requiring insulation of judicial decision-making from private interests, 
and providing that “[a] judge shall not be swayed by partisan interests, public
clamor or fear of criticism.”29 Influences that are wholly proper for a legislator 
or executive in a representative democracy are unacceptable in the judiciary. 
There is a direct connection between the likelihood of actual or apparent political 
influences and the judicial work of a judge who is also a party leader or 
campaigner; the directness of that connection establishes the same constitutional 
justification as that which supports restrictions on the speech of judges in their 
actual judicial work.
The difficult question is how far the non-partisanship principle can be carried 
into the realm of less-nakedly-political expression. A position that most highly 
values the protection of the separate and special nature of the judicial position is 
to have no judicial speech on public issues other than what is most closely 
associated to the administration of the judicial system — a position that the 
overwhelming majority of judges probably follow as a matter of their own sense 
of what is either appropriate or required by the judicial position. On the other 
hand, a position that more highly values the role of free speech and the need for 
protecting it would permit judicial speech on public issues that is not essentially 
analogous to the Code’s explicitly barred political activities.
Drawing an intermediate line raises a number of difficulties. The Model 
Code's attempt to draw such a line without in fact drawing it illustrates some of 
them. Its primary attempt is to suggest a distinction between speech related to law 
and the administration of justice and speech on non-legal subjects. Yet, it permits 
both and subjects both of them, at least on the face of its text, to the same 
potentially restrictive qualifications.
Discussion of law-related issues to which judges might make important 
contributions consistent with their judicial tasks and experience, and speech that 
is relevant or necessary to the maintenance and improvement of the legal and 
judicial system, are difficult to distinguish, except in gross extremes, from the 
discussion of other public issues that are broadly political in nature. The impact 
of mandatory minimum sentencing on a judge’s ability to deal effectively with the 
individual defendants who come before her, or the nature of a corrections system 
to which legislation, either enacted or proposed, may require the judge to sentence 
to life imprisonment all thrice-convicted felons are but two examples.
The work of the courts and opportunities for constructive broadening of the 
public’s knowledge and perception of the legal system are also involved. Chief 
justices report to legislatures and the public on issues concerning the operation of 
the courts and the funds that are needed for it. Some justices of the United States 
Supreme Court appear on highly informative and educational televised panels, 
contributing their unique perspectives to the public understanding of vital social
issues. The category of judiciary-related issues that a judge is presumably 
encouraged to discuss is not easily caged; truly meaningful discussion of such 
issues touches on public and political concerns that are broader than merely 
matters directly or narrowly affecting isolated work-a-day aspects of our judicial 
institutions. How confined in their range of relevant issues, or how constrained 
against their own candor, do we want judges to be?
Speech-protective First Amendment considerations come into play with regard 
to such comments — the judge’s own interest as a citizen and conscientious 
member of the judiciary, the interests of the judicial institutions for which the 
judges are the primary sources of information, and the general public’s interest in 
having the public discussion fully reflect the experience of those who are especially 
familiar with the situations and issues involved. The special problems of 
censorship and viewpoint discrimination that lurk in any attempt to distinguish 
appropriate and inappropriate speech on the basis of “establishment” approval 
that might assure greater “propriety” has been discussed above in connection with 
the ambivalent official “Commentary” to Model Code Canon 4B.30
On the other hand, it would not be credible to maintain that participation in 
public issue discussion can never draw judges into the political fracas in a way that 
may endanger the appearance of impartiality or judicial independence from the 
ordinary political processes. The more exclusively a public issue is associated with 
particular partisan or particular private interest groups, the greater the danger. 
The more an issue is associated with the business of the courts themselves, the less 
the danger (in general, although certainly not in all cases) and the more 
specifically related the justification is to judicial speech. Yet, this subject-matter 
based interrelationship between partisanship and the ambiguously indeterminate 
distinction between matters related to law and those related to non-legal subjects 
almost impossibly compounds the First Amendment problem. The scale of 
assessment becomes a slippery one indeed. The line seems too difficult to draw 
without threatening to preclude judicial comment on matters closely related to the 
judicial system itself or skewing the debate by imposing subject matter distinctions 
on what judges can talk about and what they cannot.
One of the difficulties inherent in the problem of drawing an intermediate line, 
however, is the unsatisfactory nature of not doing so. Taking either of the two 
more extreme positions requires an unsatisfactory alternative, the sacrifice either 
of the contributions that judges can make to constructive public discussion or of 
the protection of the judicial role.
Perhaps, in the end, the best solution does lie within the Model Code's 
ambivalence -  itself a symbol of the problem’s irresolvable nature. Let the ethic
30 Section 1 (c) of this article.
that is already established within judges’ own perception of their non-political roles 
be essentially self-enforcing, saving formal enforcement, as through disciplinary 
review, for the more egregious departures into the areas more closely analogous 
to the nakedly political activities explicitly designated by the Model Code. There 
is, after all, nothing wrong with having your cake and eating it too — if you can do 
it.
I realize that such a resolution may sound less like an American insistence on 
strict definition and enforcement of legal principle and more like an exercise in 
f>nadian reasonableness or international law’s recognition that law can include 
norms of conduct that may be inadequately enforceable. There is, however, no 
rule against an American perspective that includes a little Canadian 
accommodation.
